Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

I feel like there’s some potential in password-derived passkeys, which would get around the storage and hardware lock-in issues. It’d essentially be a master password like for BitWarden, but instead of needing an app to store a bunch of generated passwords, the master password could be all you need to authenticate.

Most of the sources of compromise for regular users would be eliminated because the password never leaves the client.

Replying to @⁨merde@sh.itjust.works⁩

Well, she also had terrible dementia for years, so the only passwords she was going to remember was the Little Orphan Annie secret code of “Drink More Ovaltine.”

My MIL is a grandma, and I would give her a 75% chance of reading her passwords to “someone from the bank” if they caught her at the right time. Maybe she’s already done that, I’m not sure if she did that or almost did that once.

Replying to @⁨GreenShimada@lemmy.world⁩

In the scheme I’m proposing, the password never gets sent to the server.

The issue of password reuse is the password getting sent to the site, because the prevailing approach is to hash the password server-side. Passwords leak because they get stored in plaintext, or hashed using outdated algorithms, or get logged with request metadata–bottom line, they end up stored somewhere that an attacker can get their grubby little paws on them, or in a way they can reasonably recover them.

Using a master password to derive a passkey client-side isn’t any different than using a master password to unlock a password manager. It just cuts out the middle step.

Replying to @⁨BiscuityCat@lemmy.world⁩

You might like the current implementation of bitwarden passkeys. You have the master password to unlock your vault of passwords and passkeys as per usual, but then the webpages connect with the extension to authenticate via passkey, so there’s no weak link where the password is sent, but changing the master password doesn’t affect all your other passkeys afaik.

Replying to @⁨Technus@lemmy.zip⁩

Bitwarden lets you store passkeys in its vault, which I think is what you’re asking for? It’s mentioned in the post too.

I have some passkeys in my Bitwarden, and my Bitwarden account is protected with a USB + NFC Yubikey.

The experience is inconsistent across phone platforms at the moment, but it works great on computers. On Android, it currently only lets you use a password manager if the passkey is your primary credential for logging into the site. Android doesn’t support passkeys from password managers for 2FA yet.

Replying to @⁨Technus@lemmy.zip⁩

The return of SASL DIGEST! (Or these days probably CRAM or SCRAM)

But yeah, the “hard” part would be that you don’t want the user to type in a password to the website because it could get snatched, so you’d want the User Agent to pop up a password prompt, you type it, and then it does the hashing etc internally and only dumps the hash into the request. So you’d still need some kind of standard for that.

Which is basically just HTTP auth from the 90s. So the good news is that’s always been possible, and already has broad support and works with all browsers! 😛

Replying to @⁨Technus@lemmy.zip⁩

I do not like the idea of password-derived Passkeys, because then acquiring the password is once again all an attacker needs.

Passkeys work now because the device itself is the second factor, the “something you have”.

It’d essentially be a master password like for BitWarden, but instead of needing an app to store a bunch of generated passwords, the master password could be all you need to authenticate.

This exactly how the flow works with Bitwarden now; I’m not understanding how your system makes any changes other than how the passkey is derived.

In fact, that makes things less secure for two reasons: if attackers learn a master password, they can derive other passkeys from it for other sites even if they cannot access the vault (not possible with current passkeys) and if you want to change your master password, all your derived passkeys become invalid and need to be regenerated.

Replying to @⁨sunbeam60@feddit.uk⁩

You world be very surprised. It’s not what I directly work on, but there are entire programs dedicated to tracking and lowering the cost of password and account resets (and doing it securely). That last part is the hard thing. Large organizations can save millions of dollars if they can get people to not lose/forget their credentials -or- self service those resets (but even then, having that person do it is now losing their time and energy).

It’s not just indirect opportunity costs either, it’s direct costs to the IT organization. Smaller teams can absorb this stuff as a rounding error on their time, but the second you’re counting in the thousands, you need to deal with this type of thing. (And I’ll repeat: securely)

Now imagine doing it as a B2C+B2B organization like Google or Microsoft. The costs are staggering.

Replying to @⁨sunbeam60@feddit.uk⁩

Not CPU costs, processing costs. Password resets are actually quite expensive. Microsoft and Google pushed the FIDO Alliance toward widespread use of a passwordless login credential because it benefited them. Google and MS get tens of millions of password resets a year. So if each one of those cost them $2 (some companies spend as much as $70 on each one if a human is involved), that’s literally tens of millions of dollars saved. Then you say “oh, for security” as the tie-in to not make it about your bottom line.

authx.com/…/how-much-does-a-password-reset-cost/ …jadaptive.com/the-true-cost-of-password-resets/ m365.fm/passwords-are-broken-passkeys-fix-everyth…

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

This article does a great job of articulating a lot of the uncomfortableness I have around passkeys. I’ve always said they make a lot more sense in an corporate environment but the level of control you lose in a personal setting is not commensurate with the protections and possible lock-in they offer.

I just don’t like passkeys. They are an overly technical solution to what is mostly a human problem.

Replying to @⁨anguo@piefed.ca⁩

Bitwarden uploads the whole vault (the whole json of passwords, passkey codes, MFA identifiers, credit card info…) encrypted with your master password. Meaning that whatever is on the cloud should be virtually unbreakable. That’s why every time you write the password in the extension or Android app or whatever it takes a second or two to open, because it’s downloading and decrypting everything locally.

When you update a password they need to reencrypt the whole vault and re-upload it again even though it’s wasteful since that’s their whole security plan.

Replying to an earlier post

This would be great if it worked consistently.

In reality, extensions work in some browsers but not others, on some websites but not others, and with passwords at least you can fall back to copying and pasting, or even typing, if auto-fill isn’t working in the context for whatever reason. With a passkey not only are you SOL, but it will delay your ability to move onto the password option if there is one.

The devils in the (implementation) details.

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

I think their biggest weakness is the vendor lock in. Using a 3rd party password manager is the best solution for most people, so they arent locked to their phone. But they are right in saying none of it is quite ready.

I think the article is forgetting, they are password replacements, not account recovery replacements. Realistically, people are just as likely to forget a password, and account recovery proceedures still have to be in place. I dont see the issue there.

Passkeys are good they are just being pushed before properly fully developed, but we are slowly getting there.

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

I agree with this article, i think all points mde are valid and true.

But is there a downside for using mozzila password manager? (other than being in the cloud) I think It allows you to sync your passwords and login information accross any device you use, it works well for phone apps, websites log in and cross platform credentials (ios, android, linux and webpages)

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

I don’t know that OP is wrong per-se, but I think they’re overstated a bit.

Their statement that passkeys are better than people using the same password, but are a step back for people using a password manager, is maybe a bit much. It’s basically the same, but sometimes better.

Most of their drawbacks are the hardware implementations, but that’s already true of people using hardware 2FA, and corporate management, which is already a problem if you use Apple’s or Google’s existing baked-in password managers.

But if you don’t already have both of those problems, the standard is basically just “instead of having the password manager pretend to type in a box, what if they dumped something into the stream directly”, and that extends to what if the UI didn’t ask for anything and just said “hey, do you want to login? Just let me know and it’s done”

And, like, should you be able to export from Apple’s built in store to migrate? Absolutely, but if you never used Apple’s passkeys in the first place, because ugh gross, then it’s not a problem you need solved yet.

There is one problem I’ll admit, which is that it’s easier to make a sketchy password manager that just pretends to be a keyboard. I myself don’t actually use passkeys because I sync my passwords with git and use pass, which is cool and I love it. And then I type them using a dmenu script and xdotool, which is silly and I love it. But that doesn’t work with passkeys which I can definitely store in git, but would require a real actual connection between my browser and the tool, in a way that I don’t think currently exists.

But just because I can’t use my sketchy crap, doesn’t always mean it’s a step back 😛

Replying to @⁨hirihit640@sh.itjust.works⁩

But does it? There are non-centralized third parties you can already use. In fact besides my sketchy password manager, is it not the case that every password manager real people are already using, already support passkeys, so it’s the same power you were likely already ceding to whoever you were already ceding it to.

But in the meantime a database leak doesn’t compromise things anymore.

Unless I’m missing something? Which is highly possible.

Replying to @⁨psycotica0@lemmy.ca⁩

Read the article, it’s all covered there. Open source password managers like bitwarden and keepass are ideal, but passkey support and integration with the OS is not there yet. With text passwords, you always had to fallback of copy and paste. With passkeys, OS integration is crucial.

My guess is that it may happen, or the big companies like Google or Apple can keep shifting the standards to keep the open source options outdated, like what Google already does with web standards.

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

I am using my password manager, which is keepass.

I have tried adding pass keys to it, and have had mixed success. On some websites, it seems to work fine, and then on others, it seems to break miserably, and made me return back to a password.

I like the idea of passkeys, because then you don’t have a shared secret between you and the website, and you get a different key for every single website using public-private key cryptography. That’s fantastic, but the implementation still needs some work.

Replying to @⁨Bluescluestoothpaste@sh.itjust.works⁩

So make the manager’s password massive. There, that complete sentence just now is over 30 characters long and could literally be a password. You can double up security with a secret file that you must locate on your PC, in KeePass, at least. You can also add notes about entries, track more than just website accounts, etc. It’s just too much brainpower to remember individual websites’ passwords. All important ones have 2FA anyway.

Managers are local to your computer so you likely messed up big-time if it got hacked, whereas websites can get hacked entirely out of our control.

Replying to @⁨Natanael@infosec.pub⁩

It’s android version dependent. Only 14 and up support 3rd party providers.

Passkeys are supported on devices that run Android 9 (API level 28) or higher.

On many devices, Credential Manager stores passkeys to Google Password Manager by default. Users can choose other password managers as its passkey providers in the System Settings on Android 14 or higher.

Given the slowness of android version rollouts, this will be an issue for a long time.

I also think supporting older androids is pushing apps to do it the “wrong” way and making it google specific.

Replying to @⁨qevlarr@lemmy.world⁩

Really depends on what you mean by passkey, since it’s actually a fairly vague term for a bundle of technologies.

I don’t really care for password manager passkeys; just use a password, all it really does is save you from needing to enter a username in a login flow.

But I’m a big fan of hardware 2fa using non-resident keys (“passkey” lite); I’ll use a regular login flow with a password manager, then the 2FA step with a hardware token. Basically bulletproof (ditto if you secure your PW manager with hw 2fa) and painless.

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

The trap: Putting any 3rd party between you and your access.
It’s a 3 card monte game, but with security.

Roleplay: Mr. Jonsith did you know your house is vulnerable? Your simple little key can be used by anyone to get in to your house. Security!? Our Keypass system will super secure your house. You give us your key, and when you want access, you come to one of our 5 in town locations, request access from us by showing us this new key here, and we will let you into your house.

Replying to @⁨Lutra@lemmy.world⁩

next year: “In order to lower our costs and keep your monthly rate low, the five locations near you are being consolidated into a single location in Farawayville.”

another year later: “In order to lower our costs and keep your monthly rate low, our physical locations are being migrated to an online presence accessible through the HahaTrickedYou app, now available in your app store.”

seven months after that: the app doesn’t work. web site disappears. company goes under.

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

Companies have had 13,000+ Data breaches in the last 5 years. Lets all put our access in one of those, so that when some thief get access to one, they get access to everything.

“But Lutra, they won’t have access-access the pieces arent all there … blah blah blah”

Oh, cool, Lets put all our access in one of those, so when they get access to one, they lock us all out of everything.

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

The problem he is describing here is mostly with enrollment and account recovery and not so much passkeys. The risk of getting locked out of accounts exists whether or not you use passkeys. Code based authenticators are not any better in this regard. Enrollment and recovery are the hardest part of identity. Passkeys are meant to address phishing risks specifically. I would love to see us do better on account recovery whether or not passkeys get adopted. The thing is, passkeys adoption is pretty slow and it has little to do with the issues described in this article. People just find it complicated and confusing. Until it is dead simple and the default, it will not find broad adoption.

Replying to @⁨xylogx@lemmy.world⁩

The core issue is identity. If people would protect a digital identity a little better than they protect a credit card, that could/should be the basis of everything. Any account “worth more” than the CC $50 liability limit should have additional layers ON TOP OF the secure identity, including front line security that must be passed before the secure identity comes into play, but that single identity could/should be an element of access control to all non-anonymous accounts.

Anonymous accounts should stick with passwords, and online material should be clearly attributed as anonymous, or sourced from a secure identity (signed by said identity and blockchained to provide provenance).

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

There is still nothing better than passwords.

I don’t want my access to be tied to a specific device. Devices get lost, or break.

I don’t want someone to be able to use my face or finger or eyeball to access my data. You can legally be compelled to unlock a device with your biometric security.

So current biometric security sucks. And passkeys suck.

Also, though…passwords suck for all the reasons that we all already know.

There has to be some better method that the owner can have full agency over, I just don’t know what. I don’t have the answers.

Replying to @⁨DJKJuicy@sh.itjust.works⁩

Every attempt at using passkeys has been a step into murkier, less easily understood, less convenient security.

Passkeys may be a “step up” from password + TFA in terms of usability, but there’s such a variety of implementations and explanations of how those implementations “keep me secure” - I feel like any idiot who grabs my phone when I’m not looking and can follow my unlock finger smudges on the screen can use my pass keys… No thanks.

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

I really wish that SQRL had taken off, as it solved most of the problems noted. It was effectively passkeys that you generated on the fly based on your private key (which you can back up and restore to other platforms if necessary) and the website domain by scanning a QR code (or clicking rh QR code if your on the same device) and sends the signed challenge to the website to auth you.

No need to login to your manager on random systems, no issues with platform lock-in, no worries about dedicated hardware, no worry about losing your access if your device dies (assuming you backup your shit).

Replying to @⁨ayyy@sh.itjust.works⁩

If SQRL was adopted, then the popular manifestations would have just as much vendor lockin, with built in password managers hosting the master private key without export option.

Passkey is not inherently vendor lock in. It’s mostly a consequence of password managers doing software passkeys and not making it reasonable to export private keys. It does have a mechanism a site can use to lock to “trusted vendors”, but if a site does that, that is on them for being dickish.

Replying to @⁨ouch@lemmy.world⁩

I agree the passkey user experience needs work, but man do I enjoy it over the haphazard ‘passwordless’ website login that just sends you an email.

I get it, they’re just skipping an attack vector and basically relying only on ‘2FA’. But now I have to go to a different app/tab, copy a code, and return to the site instead of letting the password manager fill stuff in for me. Some, like kickstarter, let you still have a 2FA code enabled so you have to grab your code from whichever authenticator and go to your email. Really nice login experience out of nowhere one day. \s

Replying to @⁨turmacar@lemmy.world⁩

The best implementation of this I’ve seen has to be Ghost, an open source self-hostable newsletter/patreon thing. They detect what email provider you have and when you enter your email, will display a link to open your inbox. It’s super neat, and I haven’t seen it anywhere else, and I’m also not sure how they do it. For something self-hostable, I’ll definitely take one less attack vector.

Replying to @⁨Joelk111@lemmy.world⁩

A DNS lookup on a domain says who runs the email server for email users on that domain (that’s how email senders figures out how to send you messages), and if that host is a known one then you can just pull the link to show. If you’re self hosting email then a few solutions can be recognized and login shown by guessing that the email software’s default URL pattern is used.

Replying to @⁨ouch@lemmy.world⁩

Microsoft 365 implementation of passkeys is sacrilegious somehow.

It requires only the Authenticator app from Microsoft and can use nothing else to create the passkey. The way this is implemented on iOS means that Authenticator comes up as an autofill option BUT IT ONLY SUPPORTS M365 and is useless for anything else. Leave it to Microsoft to take an open standard and bastardize it to the point of it being MORE CONVENIENT to just type a damn password.

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

Passkeys and 1FA were always just a duct tape solution for users resuing basic passwords without having to set a stronger password requirement or relying on users to use a strong password.

I think Chrome and Firefox should have decided on making an API for their builtin password generation and filling functions, that way any password manager would be able to integrate with foolproof functionality out of box.

People already use browser auto gen passwords for the reason that its faster and usually has an account sync built in. Now it would work with any 3rd party solution as well which covers enterprise and security minded users as well.

Users won’t use a password manager if it means you have to manually make an entry everytime you make an account.

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

This isn’t a good article @ouch. It’s dull, meandering and conflates issues.

Both Apple and Google want your identity anchored to their operating systems.

That’s true regardless of passkeys and why is Microsoft excluded here?

Logging into accounts on devices you own is the ideal scenario for passkeys. When you have to handle a colleague’s computer, it gets much more inconvenient. You could plug in a hardware key, but you don’t always have access to the ports.

What sort of drivel is this? Is anyone reading the article? I doubt it. Sorry, I’m not logging into important accounts on a colleague’s computer, regardless of being unable to squat and plug in a usb-dongle. The last statement even concedes that passkeys are an improvement for 99% of the user-population. It’s an improvement for 100% of the user-population. Like usual this is just drivel generated from friction around ‘newness’. It’s different–which automatically becomes scary for some users. The writing is just not coherent and there’s zero critique on passkey’s design and technicalities, of which there are things to criticize.

Get a physical passkey and if you have more than 100 accounts you have a problem. Buy two and use one as a backup in case you lose your first. Keep it in a safe and if you forget your safe’s combination… well, I guess we should abolish safes too: terrible account recovery support there. Yikes!

Passkey’s themselves can be protected with a PIN–the software I’ve used does not limit it to numbers. It can be your ‘master password’ if you want. This is a technical complaint of mine as all software I’ve used reference it as a PIN (personal identification number), which means numbers only. Except other characters are allowed. I’m not sure what the official spec. states.

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

One complaint I have is browser insistence that a site must have a proper certificate to work at all.

I provide self hosted software with passkey support and probably over 90 percent of my users never set up property certificates due their private networks. So the passkey function is impossible for them.

Which means they must use passwords. Which are far worse in this scenario. The practical risk either way is arguably low for them, but to take a more mitm/phishing resistant technique and then force it to not work because mitm or phishing might be in play…

Replying to @⁨filcuk@feddit.uk⁩

In an ideal world, they would be using TLS with a properly set up CA even for internal.

In practice, I can’t get most of them to do that, and instead they just click through the certificate warning and use it over https, but without certificate assurance.

So it’s still over https, though a fair argument can be made that hardly matters if the certificates aren’t validated, and browser ecosystem doesn’t consider ‘TOFU’ a valid approach like it generally is for SSH.

Anyway, the point is that passkeys are ‘security’ by virtue of not ever divulging the secret on the line. They can’t be sniffed, they can’t be captured by phishing, they can’t be retained for later use after a MITM. So the refusal to operate even with informed user consent means the user just uses a password, which is weak to all those things. In a scenario where it could provide the most mitigation is a scenario where the browsers refuse to let it try. Even the built in password manager will still auto-fill without certificate validation, one of the most risky places to be ‘helpful’.

Replying to @⁨lemmydividebyzero@reddthat.com⁩

One complaint I have is browser insistence that a site must have a proper certificate to work at all.

I provide self hosted software with passkey support and probably over 90 percent of my users never set up property certificates due their private networks. So the passkey function is impossible for them.

Which means they must use passwords. Which are far worse in this scenario. The practical risk either way is arguably low for them, but to take a more mitm/phishing resistant technique and then force it to not work because mitm or phishing might be in play…

Replying to @⁨isVeryLoud@lemmy.ca⁩

I’ve met two sorts of dedicated cybersecurity experts:

The sort that only understands how to click ‘scan’ in various tools and repeat output and browser error messages without understanding nuance. Had a fun incident where the nuance really mattered in interop with a popular product in my niche, company said we must not implement the interop because it was hopelessly insecure. When I pushed back on the nuance (folks behind the ‘vulnerable’ tech had way much more sway in the market than we did), got told I should really educate myself and read the paper on the vulnerability to understand that my proposol to workaround it was impossible. For one glorious moment in my career, I got to tell them to look at the paper again and specifically the author (I had written up the vulnerability in the first place). After a brief shock though, he still went back to even though I may have found it and explained in key detail, I still must not understand the implications…

Then there’s those that understand and can engage in nuance, but will still say inaccurate stuff, because they’ve learned being accurate and precise with the lay person doesn’t work too well, and easier to just say “big scary” instead of explaining precisely the threat model and rationale. I will confess on a number of threads I have seen this happen and let it go without correction because correcting wouldn’t have changed the core of the material, but would make the discussion go on even longer and waste more time. I personally can’t bring myself to outright say the wrong things, but I do understand why it’s the more practical strategy sometimes.

Replying to @⁨jj4211@lemmy.world⁩

I’m the kind of 'tism where I can’t get myself to tell white lies and will argue up and down until the truth prevails… sometimes to my own detriment, but I really like to understand the underlying mechanisms and the nuance underneath things, otherwise I feel lied to, and I thusly can’t get myself to feel like I am deceiving others.

Please share the paper, I’m curious!

Replying to @⁨isVeryLoud@lemmy.ca⁩

I’m trying to stay too anonymous, the paper is of super niche interest and the vulnerability comes down to a popular configuration being vulnerable, but a hardened configuration is possible, but requires randomizing some data that folks tend to leave non-random because it’s the lazier way to set that up and it wasn’t formerly recognized that the randomness of the data had security implications.