Replying to an earlier post

Well the implementation is going to be that you prove your age to the id app that only saves the info that you’re over 18. Then the id app just tells that info to the website (or app or whatever I guess). So the site doesn’t know who is trying to prove their age or even what their age is, just that they’re over 18.

It would be nice to have that sort of quick and easy app for verifying your personal information too. I don’t think we have one where I live. We always use a bank for that and that’s more hassle than I’d like

Replying to an earlier post

And how would that app verify you’ve given your actual age? Now you need to deanonymize yourself to that app and while random sites might not know who you are the app does and the app also knows every site you visit (that requests your age).

So no, that’s no longer anonymous. In practice that’s just your government (as that’s the most likely source of authority to verify your age) tracking what you’re doing on the web. Is that really preferable to parents parenting their children?

Replying to @⁨Aatube@lemmy.dbzer0.com⁩

if you can even verify it, unlike the proposed EU identity app that adds in all the obfuscation, and anti-debugging DRM of the world, also denying operation on any device and operating system not directly made by one of the two tech monopolies in the field.

but that is not only what you should worry about. even with an actually auditable app, they just change it one day and practically nobody bats an eye. the common person can not and will not check anything, it updates automatically and thry know nothing. if they don’t comply, they are immediately excluded from half the world. the thing is auditability is a nice plus, but doesn’t actually matter, because it requires a fully benevolent government. if they want to push through a change, they can roll it out in 5 minutes across the whole country and no businesses can defy it.

Replying to an earlier post

You can use a driver’s license or your bank. Different methods to verify it to the app. After verification, the app won’t save the info, just the knowledge that you’re over 18.

the app also knows every site you visit (that requests your age)

Not much of a worry locally. Disabling history is probably included in this (sort of porn mode/incognito, same as your browser). The info isn’t much use locally anyway

In practice that’s just your government (as that’s the most likely source of authority to verify your age) tracking what you’re doing on the web.

Government knows you’ve verified the app but they don’t know what you’re using the app for, it doesn’t have phone home. Your app is giving the site a generated cryptographic key, the site compares that to see if it is a valid key and then accepts it. The key doesn’t carry your personal info with it, so the central db doesn’t know who is being asked about, just whether the key is valid (so someone is 18+)

Replying to an earlier post

Now you’ve got a system without oversight. A child just needs an adult key and everything gets bypassed. And before you think it won’t be done, I know from my childhood friends who used their older sibling identification to buy alcohol without the older sibling even knowing it was being done. Kids are creative and they will find a way to bypass something without oversight. That arguably will put them in even greater danger because while kids are creative they’re not that great at assessing dangers. For example a bad actor could give keys to kids and then use that same key as blackmail to control them.

Replying to an earlier post

I know kids steal or fake ids but yeah not a reason imo to not card people hah

This whole post exists because the need to card people and then use that card to verify that person and how it opens up the door for your identifiable information getting stolen.

The child would need to get the app and have it verified (id and face scan, bank logins).

How would that work, be around to verify with the app or something?

The way your proposed solution works is that the verification process is asynchronous. The government verifies the identity in the app and then the app is used to verify identity elsewhere. Those are two separate steps that don’t happen in succession. There’s bound to be some time between the two steps if for no other reason than for the government to push the new key into third party databases (because if it uses the pull method then you’ve reintroduced government tracking. That means there’s a timeframe where person A verifies themselves, gives the key to person B and then person B uses the key until it expires. Now you need to start building in safeguards to prevent keys from leaking from within the app.

I’ll ask a counter-question since my point was is it really preferable to parents parenting. How complex (which increases how costly the development will be) and how inconvenient does it have to get for you to consider that perhaps parenting is a better solution? Because I’ll also add this, this solution doesn’t prevent “bad parenting” because a bad parent can just identify themselves and let children use their identification to bypass whatever the kids want to bypass.

Replying to an earlier post

I’m against sending pictures of your card. Just showing your card to a shopkeeper, that’s fine imo.

I don’t think there being a delay once you originally setup the app is a big issue or takes more than a few minutes max. You do that first time and then your phone is generating the key based on the master key, the site confirms the key with the central server. That sort of handshake or what it is called happens almost instantly.

Replying to @⁨Saapas@piefed.zip⁩

by denying childcare benefits, and giving a visit from child welfare.

the school should start the procedure when they see the kid scrolling social media regularly, or if the kid regularly says they want their phone (when somehow taken away) as that means they are already kinda addicted to it. child welfare investigates whether the suspicions are true, initiates denying benefits, and communicates directly with the parents being willing to support them improving the situation, including offering free assistance from child’s psychologist. then, the point becomes not denying benefits, but recognizing that they have little time to figure it out themselves, and giving all the help they need.

Replying to an earlier post

Where I live a lot of kids have bank accounts, but of course it would be silly to put a lot of money there. But can’t you deposit cash into bitcoin things and use them for payments or gift cards? I’ve seen those on some gambling sites.

And if you say “well they can steal their parent’s credit card,” how would that not equally apply to a parent’s photo ID or anything else necessary for age-verification?

Photo ID apparently needs a face scan too, it’s not enough to just have the ID. Then you get into what if they steal the ID, fool their parents and whatnot which… I don’t think that’s as much of a concern tbh

Replying to @⁨Saapas@piefed.zip⁩

I have already said I won’t be using any site requiring this unless there is a work around. I will not make advertisers lives easier. Fuck them.

While I am generally inclined to pick the lesser of two evils, not in this case. So while you are not wrong about a centralized system being less problematic, I personally cannot accept it. I gave up Meta, Zombie Twitter, Reddit, etc already.

Replying to @⁨walden@wetshav.ing⁩

Is that really what’s going on? I always thought the barcode just contained the ID number and your information. Can probably be validated that the format is correct very easily, but you can use the correct format with incorrect data easily.

I assumed the scan was still offline validation. Because if the database isn’t networkable from their store, I imagine they aren’t causing any issues in the sales process. So you would only need to precompile and print a valid barcode with correct-looking data.

Replying to @⁨testaccount789@sh.itjust.works⁩

Yeah, it could be digitally signed for offline verification. But I’m doubtful there’s enough standardization going on that corporations are integrating signature verification right there in the POS system. They’d need the public keys from the government, presumably. That doesn’t sound too difficult but also, setting up a process to get that info for all 50 states would probably be a mess. Do the states even sign the info to start — that’s another question.

I think the infrastructure can be deployed. Though, I get the impression it would take more coordination than we actually see here in the wild.

Replying to @⁨rants_unnecessarily@piefed.social⁩

The stated justification is that it somehow catches forgeries that altered the front of an ID but didn’t make the barcode information match. That might have been justifiable in like 1980 or something, but it’s reaaaaaaally not hard to generate the correct barcode these days if you’re forging an ID.

The real reason is to track and sell more data about you.

Replying to @⁨ilillilillilillililli@lemmy.world⁩

In addition to scanning and verification, VeriScan performs ID parsing to collect, separate, and classify information from the various fields on IDs. This allows Planet 13 to seamlessly harvest the names and demographic/geographic information of its guests. This data is providing insights into customer profiles, which is especially valuable as Planet 13 expands its footprint into other states, including supplementing its SuperStores with smaller, neighborhood retail shops.

I have no words.

Replying to @⁨toynbee@piefed.social⁩

Work in IT, alongside info security. Nah.

A secured app environment on a phone is plenty well secure for medical data. It is preferred strongly over a web based solution. Having a personal device running a company profile of security compliance monitoring and conditional access is as good as a company device provided by the hospital. They would do literally the same thing.

Replying to an earlier post

I think you’re making a lot of assumptions on how the setup is. It could be fine IF they configured everything correctly and are enforcing things on the work profile. Or, it could be terrible IF they just said “install this app, that’s it”.

Having a company provided device with poor guardrails would at least mean it’s not a device that the staff would do their personal stuff on, installing random apps. Having a company provided device with strong guardrails and fully locked down for this purpose would avoid most of the risk of an undiscovered vulnerability being abused. However well the work profile stuff is now separated in mobile OSs today, there can always be day 0s, and people will install any random apps on their phones or fall for plain social engineering.

Maybe technically right now they’re comparable for security, but their risk profile is different I think.

Imagine just targeting this place for phishing and creating a similar looking app with the same name, then sending fake communication to staff to say there is a new version and install it. They can just install it on their personal profile even if the work one doesn’t allow it and start putting data in it. In the case of a locked down work device they could just not install it. Also, there’s no reason for these devices to leave the grounds whereas personal devices will need to go out into the wild.

Maybe if you consider it a personal device if the staff has to relinquish all control of their entire personal device to the work provided security controls they can achieve a similar risk profile, but at that point it’s just a work device the staff had to pay for, not their personal device.

Replying to @⁨toebert@piefed.social⁩

Sigh

Please show me your masters in computer science and your decade of working with the devices. No? Then let me help you out.

It could be fine IF they configured everything correctly and are enforcing things on the work profile. Or, it could be terrible IF they just said “install this app, that’s it”.

That is true of ANY solution. If they violate this, then they are federally liable. Nothing about who owns the device changes this so it is a non-starter.

Having a company provided device with poor guardrails would at least mean it’s not a device that the staff would do their personal stuff on, installing random apps.

First, applications concerning healthcare data are going to operate in both encryption at rest and encryption in flight. They will isolate all data flow to just that app and its external managed connections. So what other things you have on the device from an App Store are irrelevant.

Having a company provided device with strong guardrails and fully locked down for this purpose would avoid most of the risk of an undiscovered vulnerability being abused.

I don’t think you understand ANYTHING about how security profiles are loaded onto a device. I will keep this to an explain like I am 5 level. None of what you just said is true. It does not matter who owns the device. If they are using it , for work, and work manages conditional access policies on the device, with security policies loaded, it will enforce ALL of the same things for monitoring data flows inside apps relevant to the workplace. It will enforce OS versions or kick your ability to authenticate. There is NOTHING that device ownership will change. Repeating this makes it very clear you have no idea what the fuck you are talking about.

However well the work profile stuff is now separated in mobile OSs today, there can always be day 0s, and people will install any random apps on their phones or fall for plain social engineering. Maybe technically right now they’re comparable for security, but their risk profile is different I think.

You think. Yes, you think, because you don’t do this for a living nor have the slightest clue what you are discussing. Again. Zero day exploits are going to be the same no matter who owns the device. They impact software under the same managed rules that exist regardless. It doesn’t change if it is a company device. Holy shit.

Imagine just targeting this place for phishing and creating a similar looking app with the same name, then sending fake communication to staff to say there is a new version and install it. They can just install it on their personal profile even if the work one doesn’t allow it and start putting data in it. In the case of a locked down work device they could just not install it. Also, there’s no reason for these devices to leave the grounds whereas personal devices will need to go out into the wild.

The reverberation speaking this much out of your ass must be immense. The whole point with a security profile is it limits these actions, and the security profile on the device is THE FUCKING SAME whether it is a device owned by you or the company. Once the employee has it configured correctly, the same in tune, same defender policies, the same OS management, the same everything could be used.

Maybe if you consider it a personal device if the staff has to relinquish all control of their entire personal device to the work provided security controls they can achieve a similar risk profile, but at that point it’s just a work device the staff had to pay for, not their personal device.

Jesus wept. You don’t relinquish control of he whole device. Unless you are working in a SCIF, your physical device is not going to have the type of controls on it that need to prevent any access to Bluetooth or WiFi. It will be only managed insofar as the profile for security requires it to be. That means you selectively block actions and abilities related only to the data within the app context and surrounding risk vectors. I’m typing this on a phone with a security profile on it for work. It serves as my Authenticator, has work application data, and doesn’t have to interfere with other personal use. You have a fundamental misunderstanding of how ANY of this works.

If you walked into Palo Alto today and sat down at the table with their engineering team, would you be telling them their firewall solution is flawed without knowing anything about it? I hope not. So why do that here?

Replying to @⁨return2ozma@lemmy.world⁩

My elderly father recently fell for a Facebook imposter that pretended to be a family member and asked if their friend could contact him. The friend asked him to take a photo of his driver’s license and text it to them, fortunately he doesn’t know how. I’ve been wondering ever since what can they do if they had it? It doesn’t have his social security number on it. His credit has since been locked and banks notified

Replying to @⁨hansolo@lemmy.today⁩

I still have to see the online service or site asking for my ID. Maybe because I’m mostly off of the bullshit-net for the most part. But the moment any service I use asks for ID, it’s getting cancelled and blocked in my house at the network level. I’m expecting my digital life to be dramatically downsized moving forward.

Car rentals, well, not many options there when traveling, since I absolutely refuse to use ride-share apps like Uber and such.

Replying to @⁨return2ozma@lemmy.world⁩

ever wonder how those food delivery app drivers seem to maybe be from another country and it’s questionable of whether or not they are working legally? there are a lot of fake driver accounts that use real drivers licenses and spoofed SSNs to create them.

Nineteen Brazilian Nationals Charged in Nationwide Conspiracy to Open Fraudulent Driver Accounts at Leading Rideshare and Delivery Service Companies

Replying to @⁨merc@sh.itjust.works⁩

Definitely more than a billion lol.

they did create thousands of fake accounts though and advertised heavily in Brasil, offering housing and vehicles to work using these accounts while securing huge referral bonuses from creating so many accounts once they hit a certain amount of deliveries.

I had roommates involved in that in the bay area at the time, they were making anywhere between 15-50k per month off of the referral bonuses doordash was offering at the time.

Replying to @⁨return2ozma@lemmy.world⁩

I don’t understand what is the point to upload all these IDs to dark web. Everything is traceable! Every transaction ect. If it would not be traceable many would just get another ID for identification on web or similar- like Sim card, because government is tracking everything, so they could track "Indiana Jones " and not me. Later just get another Sim with other iD. So, that data is available, I don’t think it’s possible to buy it without being connected to it.

Replying to @⁨Newhere@lemmy.ml⁩

I recommend listening to the podcast Darknet Diaries. It’s about sketchy things online, and very often has real accounts from real criminals talking about what they did and how they got caught.

Very often, people only get caught because 1) they get huge and greedy enough that many governments are actively trying to hunt them down, 2) they make a stupid mistake that tracks back to them personally.

There is no “the government can trace everything!” In reality, it’s more like “if someone does something egregious, a few people will spend months or years trying to find them. And maybe they’ll catch a lucky break.” Hacker OpSec is typically more than enough to frustrate the FBI for years. If they even care to look for attackers. The FBI can’t just show up in Romania and arrest people, either, so it takes international government cooperation. Which is slooooooow to move.

Replying to @⁨0x0@lemmy.zip⁩

Registering SSL is a centralized process with root CAs logging new ones as they come in. Cert transparency logs are a thing, and Google is very involved: certificate.transparency.dev

Once a bad actor hooks up to that, they just get a realtime stream of places to start port scanning and running WHOIS queries for people who didn’t get WHOIS protection. If you used letsencrypt your domains you registered certs for got sent there and anyone who wanted to know about it knew about it before you could tell anyone.

You can use something like crt.sh to look up domains

certificate.transparency.devCertificate Transparency : Certificate TransparencyCertificate Transparency

Replying to @⁨return2ozma@lemmy.world⁩

This is yet another reason why virtual ID cards are superior: In the event that the card data is compromised, the old virtual ID can be revoked and a new virtual ID can be issued. Virtual ID cards can also have a much shorter duration, because the cost of rotating it is minimal. For example, California’s virtual driver licenses rotate each 30 days.

Replying to @⁨Horsey@lemmy.world⁩

The numbers aren’t random. They are sequential. The early digits are assigned geographically, but the rest are in sequence. If you know a valid social security number, adding or subtracting 1 will be another valid social security number, most likely someone born in the same hospital on the same day.

They did change it somewhat recently, but they don’t re-assign the numbers when making that change, so most of the numbers are completely insecure.