Replying to @⁨Sibbo@sopuli.xyz⁩

What risk are you trying to mitigate, specifically?

If it’s the CA taking over your site, control over your CA specifically doesn’t really give any advantage to an attacker (they would have to hijack traffic and provide a new certificate - nobody will notice if the certificate is from a different CA).

Note that your CA cannot decrypt the exchanges between your server and its clients.

Replying to @⁨IpsumLauren@lemmy.world⁩

which is still there if you are not using lets encrypt, because they can strongarm them to make a fake cert for your domain, and install a proxy repackaging HTTPS traffic with the fake certificate. all browsers trust the lets encrypt root certificate, so they won’t see anything suspicious.

the only thing there today to detect this (but not avoid) is certificate transparency logs. all modern certificates are required to be added to this log, for the CA to remain compliant. but browsers are not checking the logs, that would be a lot of additional traffic and how do they decide if a certificate was created maliciously? also, lets encrypt could afford being noncompliant, browser vendors can’t realistically just distrust their root certificate, many sites would become inaccessible.

Replying to @⁨IpsumLauren@lemmy.world⁩

and details: wiki.mozilla.org/…/Certificate_Transparency

this sounds important:

This information has a 10 week expiration time. That is, if 10 weeks have passed since the information has been updated (typically by updating Firefox itself), the implementation will no longer enforce certificate transparency.

this also means, it can’t truly verify SCT’s that were issued since the last browser update?