posted in Selfhosted

Anyone using 6-day certs yet?

Since the beginning of this year, Let’s Encrypt rolled out a new shortlived profile for certificates that make them valid for only 160 hours. The intention, as they say, is to encourage automation and reduce the window of certificate compromise (because revocation is somewhat a flakey thing).

Yet, I haven’t seen a lot of news about it since then. Hence the question: is this shorter cert thingy something you considered and deployed for your homelab?

As for me I’ve set up lego-acme with profile: “shortlived” on my rig. Lego runs on a bihourly cronjob, but only renews when a cert has >=3 days to expiry. It’s been pretty much a set-and-forget experience, although some more monitoring would be nice.

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Replying to @⁨stratself@lemdro.id⁩

Thabknyou for sharing. I had missed the announcement, so pleased to know the option is available.

I have fully automated the creation and renewal of my certs and have just short of 50 certs that I manage in total. Every single one automated using NixOS / ACME / lego.

Technically I could easily implement this, just have to switch my config.

Honest question, are there any particular security benefits to this (especially for a home lab)?

I can understand the short lived time span further reduces risk of compromise, yet the existing time span is already “much shorter than traditional certificates”. Does it have a substantial impact on our security posture?

Replying to an earlier post

At work, I used ssh-signed certificates for Linux server access - those certs are only valid for about 15 minutes.

The whole idea of shorter lifetime certificates is to address if a certificate is compromised. (Especially for client certificates which, iirc, Let’s Encrypt no longer offers).

For a home lab? With no externally accessible services? Short-lived certs aren’t really a big deal. Nobody is going to be hacking your homelab, stealing your private keys, poisoning your internal DNS, and pointing you to a different, malicious service.

Replying to @⁨plateee@piefed.social⁩

If you’re a developer for an important open source project, they might.

Attacking the xz project wasn’t done because the attacker cared about anything that the xz maintainer had. It was because he was trusted and the software he maintained had been given a fair bit of trust by certain maintainers and could be compromised and used as a vector into other systems that indirectly relied on that open-source project.

Replying to @⁨plateee@piefed.social⁩

I had no idea “single use certificates” were a thing. It makes sense, although from my personal perspective I have always worked with managed identities and privilege escalation.

I have almost no internet facing services, although the two I have I might swap for the short lived variants. As you said, risk of misuse due to compromise goes down so that makes sense.

For my other services, they are all running on HTTPS, but only available internally over LAN or VPN, all with isolated VLANs sort of like a Hub Spoke model. The two certs that are internet facing are basically for getting access to my VPN. Might swap the internal services to short lived anyway if the automation works well, as I said before, it’s fully automated anyway.

Replying to @⁨stratself@lemdro.id⁩

Certbot came with a systemd timer running twice a day (0, 12 +12h random) that only renews –iirc– when the certificate has 30 days or less to live. Also I looked it up and my (version 6.7) Certbot neither mentions the option with the --help option, nor in the manual (where there is just one instance of “profiles exist, no other details given”).

So they probably need another way than a random blog post when they want users to use (or even just know about) that option…

It’s been pretty much a set-and-forget experience

Yeah, that’s what it always has been. So no need to change anything unless they make it the new standard on their side with an update…

Replying to @⁨Ooops@feddit.org⁩

@Ooops @stratself Certbot renews a certificate when the remaining lifetime is lower than 30 %. If you change the profile from tlsserver (90 days) to shortlived (6 days), you do not need to adjust the renewal interval manually, because it is relative to the cert livetime.
I think it is not Letsencrypt's part to document how to use the different profiles with certbot. It should be explained in the documentation of the ACME client (certbot and others).

Replying to @⁨pdl@social.tchncs.de⁩

I know that I could easily change my config. My point is that a) they are failing to advertise this and b) I don’t see any reason to do it. I understand the arguments about security benefits of shorter certificates on their side and iirc they are already planning to change it from 3 months to 1.5 months in the future. But in what scenario do I benefit from a short-term certificate as long as the regular ones are still available anyway?

Replying to @⁨Ooops@feddit.org⁩

@Ooops I do not understand what you mean with "they are failing to advertise this". Letsencrypt has announced in in their blog:
letsencrypt.org/2025/01/16/6-d
letsencrypt.org/2025/02/20/fir
The profiles are documented:
letsencrypt.org/docs/profiles/
It is your deciscion what profile to use. If you use the shortlived profile and your key is compromised, you benefit from the short lifetime. This benefit you have regardless of the availability of the 90 day certs.

letsencrypt.org/2025/01/16/6-day-and-ip-certs

Replying to @⁨pdl@social.tchncs.de⁩

If you use the shortlived profile and your key is compromised, you benefit from the short lifetime.

Maybe I’m just too stupid to understand how those certificates work.

But in what scenario is my key compromised but not my server? Because someone getting control of my server can just get an new long-term certificate. That was my actual point in the comment above. I understand the argument of added security if they only issue short-term certificates. But where is the benefit of my short-term certificate when someone compromising my server can just get a new long-term one in seconds?

Also we are talking about self hosting. I understand the issue of revoking certificates when you have a massive userbase where some might miss the revocation for quite some time. Not so much with the dozen max family and friends.

Replying to @⁨stratself@lemdro.id⁩

I’m happy with 90 day certs for homelab stuff: I’m not worried about anyone MITMing my network. I figure the short lived certs are more important for people who provide services with a significant external user-base, or who process sensitive transactions.

I have my certbot set to check every 12 hours and renew at 60 days. Renewing every 3 days would be 20x more load on Let’s Encrypt systems, and that feels like abuse of a free service for my use case.

Replying to @⁨sonstwas@sh.itjust.works⁩

Several reasons

  • If a private key leaks, a shorter certificate lifespan limits the fallout
  • Faster upgrades to new cryptographic standards. If some of the crypto methods used get broken, short lived certificates means they get replaced with newer methods faster
  • Short lived certificates force sysadmins to automate the renewal process. This prevents expired certificates due to forgetting the manual renewal.
  • Certificate lifetime and domain ownership mismatch. You could buy a 2 year certificate for somedomain.com and then sell the domain or just let it expire and have it picked up by someone else. You then have a valid certificate for a domain you no longer ow and you could MitM traffic for the new owner’s website.

Replying to @⁨BorgDrone@feddit.nl⁩

You make some good arguments so I’m not attacking you at all, just my thoughts on your points. These short renewal times are getting to the point of ridiculousness and creating another point of failure with little time to do anything about it. I find these super short certs less than useful, create many more possible problems, and not really necessary except for a small set of circumstances. And I have been in IT as a web dev/sys admin/systems architect for over 30 years now.

  • If a private key leaks you’ve likely done something wrong. Practice better key management and don’t be stupid
  • Updating certs to keep up with new crypto standards is useless. For one they don’t change that often and if there is a pressing reason you can’t update earlier.
  • Yes the processes have to be automated which is not a bad idea at all. But you are completely relying on the service to not be down and that something on your end hasn’t also broken. Anybody that hasn’t ever been a sys admin has had several automated process die for no apparent reason.
  • This could actually be an issue but totally out of your control. This is only relevant if you domain hop frequently and if your that worried about security, you aren’t doing that.

Replying to @⁨sonstwas@sh.itjust.works⁩

A private key leaking is bad, since anyone with the private key can decrypt data that was encrypted with it.

Traditionally, the way that leaked certs were handled was via Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL). CRLs contain lists of revoked certificates - their serial number, revocation date, and the reason why they were revoked.

However, CRLs are imperfect. Checking for revoked certificates every time you go to a site would slow things down a lot, as the lists are now too large to check and download real-time. Modern browsers and other TLS clients periodically download the lists in the background. Also, it might take a while between when the certificate is compromised and when the company notices the compromise.

Because of this, the CA/Browser forum (a group with all the major browser and TLS certificate vendors) have started dropping the max lifetime of certificates. The idea is that even if a private key does leak, the time frame that it’s usable for will be significantly shorter and any leaks should (in theory) cause less damage.

  • The original maximum duration was 39 months: Three years plus an extra three months leeway for obtaining and deploying new certificates.
  • March 2018: Reduced to 825 days
  • September 2020: Reduced to 398 days
  • March 2026: Reduced to 200 days
  • March 2027: Planned to reduce to 100 days
  • March 2028: Planned to reduce to 47 days

All modern deployments, regardless of if they’re using free or paid certs, should have their renewals fully-automated, so in theory the validity period shouldn’t matter as much as it did in the past. All major vendors (Let’s Encrypt, DigiCert, Sectigo, GlobalSign, AWS, SSL .com, etc) support ACME now. Reducing the validity is also a forcing function t o ensure automation is actually implemented.

somehow else in the middle and just can “ignore” certs renewals?

I’m not sure that’s possible, since an attacker in the middle shouldn’t be able to obtain a valid certificate for the domain. Certificates have a “not valid after” date encoded into them, after which the certificate is considered invalid and you get an error.

Replying to @⁨chunkystyles@sopuli.xyz⁩

Yeah but if you want to use something different, or may need to use different web servers or proxies from time to time, it’s better to have the cert renewal stuff separated.

Also, for any provider that’s off the beaten path you have to build caddy yourself to include the right plugin and that’s just meh.

Caddy’s fine if you only use one provider and only Caddy all the time but other than that no.

Replying to @⁨stratself@lemdro.id⁩

Acronyms, initialisms, abbreviations, contractions, and other phrases which expand to something larger, that I’ve seen in this thread:

Fewer Letters More Letters CA (SSL) Certificate Authority DNS Domain Name Service/System TLS Transport Layer Security, supersedes SSL VPN Virtual Private Network

[Thread #119 for this comm, first seen 7th Oct 2026, 05:50] [FAQ] [Full list] [Contact] [Source code]

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