I know Mastodon hates LLM's and AI. So here goes!

I recently got access to trusted access of cyber capabilities of both openai and anthropic, which also allows you to weaponize security vulnerabilities.

The speed at which these parrots can find bugs and be creative enough to exploit them is staggering.

I recently pointed an LLM at an kernel fix that was reachable by an unprivileged namespace on Debian and it fully weaponized it, without too much me prompting it in the right direction, in about 7-9 hours.

I don't think open-source and companies will know what's coming for them once these open-source weight models will have broader reach and get better at exploiting vulnerabilities on a massive scale as anyone can access them.

The bottom line I think is, you cannot patch faster than the attackers can easily chain all kinds of vulnerabilities together and just move laterally on an incredibly fast pace.

I've started reporting vulnerabilities to all kinds of projects and the majority have trouble or patching issues found. There's not enough maintainers, or there's simply none anymore.

I've been getting quite worried about what our future will look like for data privacy. I think outright not running an LLM over your codebase to find critical security vulnerabilities because of your moral stance will keep us more insecure.

Please run an LLM over your code base if it's internet facing or something critical, we thank you!

Can't wait for the discussions on this!

en

Replying to @⁨ljrk@todon.eu⁩

@buherator @drwhax

1. Acceptance. There's the saying "you just need to be more secure than your neighbor". It's not fully true but biz people hold it so. It's flip side is a cynic commentary on security, and a true one at that: If your neighbor is not secure, you don't need to be either. This is still true if you're getting pwned. When everyone's getting hacked regularly, society will accept this new reality. Only the defense sector will still care for security. We've seen similar developments in different industries: Fast fashion isn't an adequate replacement for garment that stands the test of time. But it's getting impossible to buy good clothes, even if you want to. But also with other goods: If everyone produces low quality items, it's financially more reasonable to do the same.

2. Centralization. Coz we won't do the right thing and reduce complexity, we need to find a way to make complexity "secure": Cloud, Big5, etc. Corps that have the resources to host an Exchange server securely... or in compliance with regulations. Every tool you do not let a big house host is a liability. Not coz they're necessarily more secure, but because nobody will blame you if something gets wrong. We had that with "buying IBM" once.

I hate this outlook but I seriously doubt that we will correct course.

Replying to @⁨rysiek@mstdn.social⁩

@drwhax finding vulnerabilities can be stochastic because it has a very clear and effective verification function: either the exploit works or it does not. Exploit code can be messy and convoluted, as it is not going to be maintained after the vulnerability is fixed.

Vibe-coding fixes does not have that kind of verification function: the fix must not only close the specific vulnerability, but *also* not introduce new ones or re-introduce old ones, and it has to be maintainable in the future.

Replying to @⁨rysiek@mstdn.social⁩

@drwhax and just to drop some data on vibe-coded software quality:
faros.ai/blog/ai-acceleration-

The report tries to be very "AI"-positive. But the numbers don't lie: +861% code churn, +242% incidents per PR, +54% bugs per developer.

www.faros.aiThe AI Engineering Report 2026: The AI Acceleration Whiplash - Ten TakeawaysWhat two years of telemetry data from 22,000 developers reveals about AI's real impact on developer productivity, code quality, and business risk in 2026.

Replying to @⁨glitchypixel@mastodon.gamedev.place⁩

@drwhax But are you maling a tech bro richer to vibe code everything you do and just pressing Y without thinking, wasting tokens as much as possible because who cares? I have beef.

Are you actively (and disgustingly so), trying to replace every human in the loop just to create ghibli styled art slop or disgusting political videos so you can further your agenda? I have beef.

Are you actively numbing your brain, stop thinking about anything and becoming a reverse centaur on purpose? I have beef.

Replying to @⁨glitchypixel@mastodon.gamedev.place⁩

@drwhax I personally dont and will never vibe code because, in a very personal position, I love my brain and I like to think, and a brain without friction will cease to function (use it or lose it).

I love people making art (and yes, this includes code). And I deeply hate the contempt for people paying a tech bro to use genAI to dismiss and degrade those artists with a sort of vindictive glee, especially since most artists are already treated so badly. It is disgusting.

Replying to @⁨glitchypixel@mastodon.gamedev.place⁩

@drwhax But I don't mind the underlying tech as much as I dont have a beef against the, let's say Microsoft Kinect (a tool made in essence the same way).

So are you getting a Chinese open weight, AI (people won't say it, maybe because of fear of retaliation from the US, but most companies will do this) stuffing it in your server and having 90% effectiveness to find vulnerabilities and doing static analysis in code locally?

That sounds like an actual use case. Just one the tech bros don't like.

Replying to @⁨can@haz.pink⁩

@can yes for sure!

There's a couple things you can do, one of them is indeed as basic as, this is app XYZ, written in PHP, review the codebase for security problems, then adversarially review your findings before writing them down in findings/ per bug in markdown. Also make a root cause and look for variants of the same class of issues across the code base.

What are some good skills to run is from Trail of Bits which are open-source: github.com/trailofbits/skills

If it's C/C++, LLM's are pretty good at making fuzzers and seeding the dictionary needed to fuzz them effectively.

If it's open-source you can apply for some openai codex api grant: openai.com/form/codex-open-sou

github.com/trailofbits/skills
Trail of Bits Claude Code skills for security research, vulnerability detection, and audit workflows - trailofbits/skillsGitHubGitHub - trailofbits/skills: Trail of Bits Claude Code skills for security research, vulnerability detection, and audit workflowsTrail of Bits Claude Code skills for security research, vulnerability detection, and audit workflows - trailofbits/skills

Replying to @⁨buherator@infosec.place⁩

@buherator @drwhax I sometimes advise investors (poor life choices I guess) on how to deal with the increased risk of Mythos & others. And this was the bottom line.

I don't even need AI specifically to argue for that. The time-to-exploit has been dropping forever. We've built better catalogs and more versatile infrastructure and complex automations. It's very clear that this includes vuln research as well.

We had this already with static analysis hitting the field. We answered with "shift left": Building security into the dev process, since the earlier you do it, the less issues you'll end up with. Every step earlier has more downstream impact.

We've finally reached the stage where security as part of your design & architecture is not only best practice but becoming a hard requirement. Our automations (including LLMs) pushed us there and we need to deal with the outcome.

Or should. Because I'm a cynic and I've seen what's happened, I doubt that engineering will follow through with this. I see two paths and we'll move along both, and I don't like either: Acceptance and few centralized Oligopols.

1/2

Replying to @⁨ljrk@todon.eu⁩

@ljrk @buherator @drwhax

The nice thing about open source is that there's always *someone* doing whatever obscure thing the mainstream finds too niche. I'm sure there are people right now who have for decades been building smaller software, and maybe for a certain non-corporate group there can be a pivot to that stuff. To avoid an endless edge of new code to harden, you need to forgo compatibility with new software & hardware, which has until now meant relative uselessness. But given how the AI bubble is driving up hardware prices, and the fact that we've seen standards like USB mature to a point that feels like it could be stable for a decade or more, maybe the endless cycle of new hardware stuff just slows down in certain backwaters. Of course this is anathema to corporate strategies, but I wonder if given the fact that the churning edge will be nearly impossible to secure, maybe a chunk of consumers will find ways to be satisfied with a smaller more stable core.

Replying to @⁨tiotasram@kolektiva.social⁩

@tiotasram @buherator @drwhax Absolutely. I believe that, for personal use, low-power devices, cloud-less with P2P collab features are a viable route. I fear however, that using such devices becomes ever harder w/o locking yourself out of the rest of the world: Requiring apps for concert tickets, public transports, online banking, or event finding events through instagram. The latter can possibly be fixed through better communities, the former is hard to address, except by having a personal device and one just for carrying such credentials.

Replying to @⁨ljrk@todon.eu⁩

@ljrk @drwhax Re: 1., the usual question we got from CISO and above on our reports is "how does it look compared to similar companies?". I agree that this is in part the "you don't have to outrun the bear" logic, but also that people in position don't want to look incompetent in front of their peers.

Another thing is that you don't get fired if you didn't follow the hackers advice, but you do get fired if you don't pass compliance which is one part BS, and the other part is easy to cheat.

Replying to @⁨ljrk@todon.eu⁩

@ljrk @buherator @drwhax Part of the source of this is the lawyers. In business, companies are typically shielded from liability if they follow "standard and customary business practices". So if "everyone else" is doing it that way, you can too without taking on the liability.

Of course, that takes you only so far. If your business is unable to function for two months, legal liability may well be the least of your concerns. But the problem with that threat is that it's a gray rhino risk. Those are really really hard to get businesses to spend on mitigating.

For better or worse, LLM-based attacks may remove most of the gray from those risks and reduce the resistance to mitigation.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax I think we need a bit of nuance here.

As much as I am no fan of LLMs, I can see the value of running them over one's own codebase in order to find vulnerabilities.

But I remain unconvinced that vibe-coded fixes are a good idea, or ever will be. I think this needs to be clearly said.

The reason is that these are fundamentally different problems.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax the problem is this works better for certain tasks (finding vulnerabilities) and much worse for other tasks (vibe-coding) because of the shape of these tasks.

"Human in the loop" is not the get-out-of-LLM-problems-free card people try to pretend it is.

Human in the loop works for vulnerability findings because there is a reliable way of verifying the finding. It clearly does not work well for vibe-coding at all because there is no such reliable way of verifying code correctness.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax I am very very doubtful we will in any meaningful way.

In the end coding is an exercise in translating intentions into machine-readable code, and also an exercise in communication between those whose intentions are enshrined in code, and those who then need to maintain it.

We will be able to automate some things slightly better, though. But then the question is: at what cost?

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax oh I've been talking about smaller open-weights models for a long time now. A leaked Google memo ("we have no moat") mentioned them as a massive problem for them years ago. I have much less problem with using small, specialized, self-hosted, open-weights models.

In fact I know of at least one small company that already does this for vulnerability testing of their own code, avoiding most of the BS.

That said, it is still immensely expensive for them to run it on their own infra.

Replying to @⁨rysiek@mstdn.social⁩

@rysiek @drwhax
"...the problem is this works better for certain tasks (finding vulnerabilities) and much worse for other tasks (vibe-coding)"

This. Good at finding vulnerabilities, decent at creating an exploit blueprint, mediocre at verifying actual severity, and very much meh at creating a fix. Not the best combination out there, but alas, the first half necessitates the discussion.

Replying to @⁨rysiek@mstdn.social⁩

@rysiek Human in the loop is important here, vibe-coded patches are most of the time not very good. However, the models do tend to improve, but what really helps in this case in lets say an C/C++ code base, alright parrot, make me an fuzzer that fuzzes these paths and we'll let it run on every commit so we can catch things.

Last night, well, eherm,... 2am, my parrot was adding a fuzzer to code that hadn't been fuzzed and it showed, bugs came falling out.

The human needs to stay in the loop with all these things of course, i'm not advocating for a pure AI/LLM/Parrot solution. But oh boy, are they good at pattern recognition.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax I'm paid by Red Hat to do this, and am given access to all the resources I need -- but it must be soul destroying for an open source contributor just doing OSS for fun as a hobby.

I keep telling myself that all this security stuff isn't much fun, but it probably makes open source stronger in the long term.

I think it helps to have very strict rules upstream for the flood of AI reports, e.g. github.com/fwupd/fwupd/blob/ma

github.com/fwupd/fwupd/blob/main/SECURITY.md#reporting-a-vulnerability
A system daemon to allow session software to update firmware - fwupd/fwupdGitHubfwupd/SECURITY.md at main · fwupd/fwupdA system daemon to allow session software to update firmware - fwupd/fwupd

Replying to @⁨hughsie@mastodon.social⁩

@hughsie @drwhax I think a lot of projects aren't clear where they stand between professional and hobby development and how much responsibility they should be taking on. Just because you donated some work to the world as FOSS and a company picked it up and distributes it as part of a product, doesn't make you responsible for the "supply chain" your hobby project finds itself in. IMHO any company which ships FOSS (which is _all_ of them) needs to vendor their dependencies, or have a contractual agreement for maintenance, and not just rely on the goodwill of the original author or volunteers for things like security, QA / CI testing, etc. I feel like a number of devs have gotten suckered into a culture of emulating commercial professional development (using an issue tracker, reviewing merge/pull requests, having numbered version releases, using CI and test suites, etc.) for things which are fundamentally non-commercial hobby projects and end up deeply unhappy burning their nights and weekends doing software maintenance because "people depend on them", like a martyr, and it feels rude to tell those people to get stuffed.

I think a fundamental way we should structure human systems is to limit the responsibility (and correlated damage) any one person can have on their own because our poor little meat-brains aren't really built for it.

Replying to @⁨raven667@hachyderm.io⁩

@raven667 @hughsie @drwhax EU is attempting parts of this. We'll see about how the realexisting version of this will turn out.

Other than that: Ensure awareness for said corporates by enforcing the existing rights on the components they use.
There'll probably have to be some sort of enforcement threshold or staggered requirements.

And a large part of it is probably to just answer to requests for features/fixes/... with "pull request welcome" or "here's my hourly rate" to any corporate requests.
Unfortunately, this is not trained for.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax It's not that you're wrong but you're not specific enough. Which AI, in what way? Plus, though I see you have enough technical expertise you come out with that OpenAI/Claude vibe that I detest. We should use LLMs, but in our own way, after stripping away the hype. All the LLM technobros have been stealing our code and other people's copyrighted work, and now want to sell it back to us with added bias, lack of provenance and old data. Excuse me if I'm not wildly enthusiastic about their for-profit products.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax On the flip side, when the subsidy for compute ends, edge computing will become affordable again. And given that things like rudimentary voice recognition now has been reduced to models that fit in an ESP32, I am inclined to think that special-purpose LLMs may be a cat that has left the bag or at least to be in a different league than frontier models.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax Look, many people have different reasons to be against AI.

Mine is a very specific position against vibe coding, generative AI and ghoulish tech bros and their wannabes wanting to actively destroy excellence, art, nature and human work.

If you have a tool that does not contradict these specifics, then I have no issue. A static analyser ML-like code tool that works on premises, doesn't make a tech bro richer and dry a lake? This is OK for me (and I suspect, the future or much of this)

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax

> I think outright not running an LLM over your codebase to find critical security vulnerabilities because of your moral stance will keep us more insecure

You're missing the point. Even strong "AI critics" have already been seen to use these tools for these scans themselves. Just like other static code analysis tools and so on.

The main point and what people despise the most is when randoms use it and file bug reports they don't understand causing high workload validating their crap.

Replying to @⁨galacticstone@mastodon.social⁩

@galacticstone @drwhax

The problem is that "we" is bearing a burden here that it can't actually sustain. It sounds great, but "we" does not include the adversaries, so "we" can't actually do this.

The "we" that includes people who think data centers are a bad idea can and should push back on them, just like we can and should push back on jet travel because of its carbon footprint. But if we unilaterally disarm, that makes us less, not more, likely to succeed.

Systemic problems can't be solved by opting out.

Replying to @⁨wolf480pl@mstdn.io⁩

@wolf480pl sometimes, sometimes they don't, sometimes one finds a better way to chain vulnerabilities to achieve a certain objective. It all depends a bit on the harness as well, lots of small knobs to twist.

Some benchmarks are available on: exploitbench.ai/

ExploitBench: Real exploitation is a ladder. Capability-graded V8 exploit benchmark.ExploitBenchExploitBenchHow far up the exploitation ladder can an agent climb on a production JS engine? ExploitBench measures frontier LLMs on full-control V8 exploit synthesis with 16 capabilities measured per run and multi-round shuffled-layout grading.

Replying to @⁨wolf480pl@mstdn.io⁩

@wolf480pl @drwhax
Often open source LLMs that you can run on your own computer find the same bugs with the appropriate tools and instructions. It's mostly hype based on fear or as Lee Vinsel named it: «criti-hype»
aisle.com/blog/ai-cybersecurit

AISLEAI Cybersecurity After Mythos: The Jagged FrontierWhen AISLE tested Mythos's showcase vulnerabilities on small, cheap, open-weights models, most found the same bugs. Here's what that means for cyber.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax a lot of people have already said a lot of smart things in your replies, so i'll skip to a new direction:

why did you recently get access to these models? from a "media literacy" point of view, i feel like i don't know how to read your statement without knowing what your context is.

are you working with these models as part of a third-party, independent evaluation / audit? or are you working within a contract with either of these companies, do you receive money from them?

Replying to @⁨gimulnautti@mastodon.green⁩

@gimulnautti @drwhax no

you're legitimizing the marketing stunts of these companies, which both aim, in the current media hype cycle, to make themselves the main coveted technology of armies around the world

all the while erasing responsibility and accountability

i want these companies held legally liable. for their involvement in bombing a school full of young girls, for example

i don't want to read an ex-Amnesty Security Lab employee praise the same company that contributed to war crimes

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax not simply open source models, but inference chips that specialise on one model and car run them hundreds of times faster and cheaper, like the Taalas project

I honestly can't wait for the meltdown of my own sector. Imagine if making an internet service business suddenly becomes impossible, because if intelligent cyber attacks!

It's just so exciting, can't wait

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax we also recently got the access and its insane. We are debating when the open source models getting close / similar to it to setup a cluster and provide resources to smaller open source projects and ngo security related folks to make sure these ones are not left behind. But this requires a lot of effort and funds and also training for people involved so for now its just on our list of possible projects.

Replying to @⁨macattackmicmac@mastodon.social⁩

@macattackmicmac for that particular session it was roughly 122 USD in API costs, but since it was subsidized, it was only $20 in a subscription: gist.github.com/DrWhax/465da15

gist.github.com/DrWhax/465da154f2ac1575cfc72aa71aa979e6
GitHub Gist: instantly share code, notes, and snippets.Gistgist:465da154f2ac1575cfc72aa71aa979e6GitHub Gist: instantly share code, notes, and snippets.

Replying to @⁨failedLyndonLaRouchite@mas.to⁩

@failedLyndonLaRouchite They are, but they have flaws and the way these models are created is quite shit and there's a lot of things to say about that. It's not that I say, anthropic good, or openai good. It's more to say, we're entering an era with a lot of shit going to be thrown at people, companies and maintainers and I don't think people realize what's about to hit them!

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax What will any of this matter when we have turned the planet into a desert and caused our own extinction level event? There is an assumption that we will have access to electricity for any of this conversation to matter; when every day people have to deal with over 100° hot weather, rolling black outs, and drinking water restricted for anyone not rich/wealthy?

But let's keep protecting the people that made these problems and continue to make them worse. Justifying another technology built on theft and slave labor, I don't understand how anyone can be okay with that. We cannot separate the technology from its history, negative environmental impact, and that this technology is another scam to hoard even more wealth. The companies are using Enron's tactics for money and the packaging of debt into bad deals like 2008 in the USA is leading us to a very difficult time, where once again, these conversations will not matter as people will br trying to just survive.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax You could patch faster but as the recent HF / OpenAI cyber attack stunt shows the big models and their cyber crap filters refuse to even talk to petty maintainers about security stuff, but will happily slopify code with myopic seds and greps. Case in point, even the Anthropic CVP does not apply to Fable, which writes code all the time that it can't review thanks to the zealous security filter, and is therefore useless where it would be needed most.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax I've been very concerned about the emergence of Mythos-class AI that can weaponize vulns. I'm personally responding by adding formal memory safety proof coverage to critical libraries in C (notably: OpenSSL). Testing - which can identify many but not all bugs - I no longer consider sufficient. Instead we need formal verification to prove the *absence* of bugs/vulns. #aicoding #security

Replying to @⁨koehntopp@infosec.exchange⁩

@koehntopp this parrot is really good at pattern recognition, it can code and fix some I think given enough constraints and a feedback loop of adversarial review, but it still might not be up to the style of the codebase or it might even introduce new vulnerabilities. I still think we also haven't it fully figured out yet? I think this needs more benchmarks that are reproducible in some fashion

Replying to @⁨fabrice@fosstodon.org⁩

DrWhax@drwhax@infosec.exchange

@koehntopp this parrot is really good at pattern recognition, it can code and fix some I think given enough constraints and a feedback loop of adversarial review, but it still might not be up to the style of the codebase or it might even introduce new vulnerabilities. I still think we also haven't it fully figured out yet? I think this needs more benchmarks that are reproducible in some fashion

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax
I'm glad you've invited discussions on this, because my immediate thoughts and questions diverge from the discussion I'm primarily seeing here. When you mention vulnerabilities, yes you mention they exist in code as well as in projects. When I think of vulnerabilities, I think of the method I am using to make and maintain a record of something or else to achieve a goal or state of physical safety. For example, if my household accounting spreadsheets and forecasts are handwritten then the vulnerability is risk of loss if the dog eats them, but risk is mitigated when I keep an offline digital file. When a family member starts a small business, I ask the questions learnt in my accounting and auditing classes because I believe the risks involved include thinking about how to prevent losses of whatever is important. I only had a couple of BASIC programming classes in 1984, but it seemed to me that in those days the instructor felt we should understand the process so that we could consider risks. I now wonder if the machine-assisted searching allows you to consider the assorted practical situations of each business whose vulnerabilities are being sought.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax Computer vulnerabilities, alright that's fair. When I took the Computerized Accounting class in 1985, students were told the business should continue the manual accounting methods concurrent with the new processes for two years, or more, because certain daily functions could look alright while other annual functions might not be obvious until after the annual reports are printed and reviewed. That was how us old people were taught about computers, they said the data needed to be confirmed as accurate before we could trust it.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax so disclaimer, I’m not a coder or understand much about coding, but I have to mention this because it did make me laugh (hope someone finds this funny too)
When you mentioned your “parrot” at work breaking things apart & finding “vulnerabilities” (yes I know you were referring to the program 😹) my first thought was : “if you could make a program like that I think the best name for it would be a Kia parrot” (use scientific name probably 😹)
(From their propensity to break things apart 😹)

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax Nah, i don't care anymore. I'd rather let them break everything than get blackmailed. Fuck it, honestly, the internet is a pile of shit these days anyway, let it burn. I'mm done feeling bad about this while everyone keeps holding down the pedal as we rush towards the wall.

What does it matter, seriously? Soon it will be too expensive for any normal person or project to run anyway and then only bad actors will use it. So what's this? A bandaid for the break dam? Pointless.

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax This may be one of the only niche use cases where LLM technology may actually be useful, and it may be what Linus Torvalds was talking about when it comes to AI and the Linux kernel. Directly deploying AI code in the kernel could violate the GPL.

But as for auditing existing code for potential vulnerabilities, and the pen-testing stuff, this may be a viable use case.

But that's not what the AI companies promote. They promote the AI-powered shovelware development use case instead.

Replying to @⁨alice_pea_3526@mastodon.social⁩

@alice_pea_3526 the parrots are pretty good at pattern recognition which is where I think they shine. Some smaller projects as well, but architecture wise, you'll have to handhold them a lot. Its almost like having a junior that's good in some incredibly niche things, but you'll be iterating a lot over code.

I think curl maintainer said something similar, the reports used to be bad from LLM's and they suddenly got a lot better. It still requires a pair of human eyes to understand if its not hallucinating.

I wish it was better at eliminating whole bug classes tho, that'd be the ideal situation?

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax One thing I don't see anyone addressing is how we got into this situation in the first place, or how we get out of it, and I'm not talking about the LLM or any of the already well known and discussed downsides of that.

How did the software get so insecure in the first place? How do we prevent security vulnerabilities before they occur? Most of the risks aren't unknown or even novel, so why haven't we prioritized the solutions?

Replying to @⁨zimzat@mastodon.social⁩

@zimzat No one wants to fund it is what I think.

Suhosin did something like this for PHP, now it's just jvoisin maintaining snufflepagus: github.com/jvoisin/snuffleupag

I don't remember if there was something similar for other languages. Grsecurity for the Linux Kernel, that's the three I know :/

github.com/jvoisin/snuffleupagus
Security module for php7 and php8 - Killing bugclasses and virtual-patching the rest! - jvoisin/snuffleupagusGitHubGitHub - jvoisin/snuffleupagus: Security module for php7 and php8 - Killing bugclasses and virtual-patching the rest!Security module for php7 and php8 - Killing bugclasses and virtual-patching the rest! - jvoisin/snuffleupagus

Replying to @⁨drwhax@infosec.exchange⁩

@drwhax I think the biggest lesson here is that Blue Team can't rely on patching to keep everything safe.

We have to actually do the rest of the stuff that security calls for, and not just keep everything patched but do more to minimize the risks when one of these unsleeping tools gets turned on us.

And so many companies don't even have a proper inventory of what-all needs to be kept up to date.

This is going to suck so much.