Andrew Nesbitt

@andrewnez@mastodon.social · Joined ⁨Apr⁩ ⁨2017⁩

Package Management Nerd, working on mapping the world of open source software ecosyste.ms and blogging about package managers at nesbitt.io

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The GitHub Blognpm publish-time malware scanning and dual-use metadata - GitHub ChangelogAs part of our ongoing supply-chain security work, npm is introducing automatic scanning of packages at publish time. This changelog covers what publishers can expect and a new metadata requirement…

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Lots of new stuff in pip 26.2:

🍊 Support for Python 3.15
🍊 Selecting only dependencies
🍊 Experimental: venv based build isolation
🍊 Faster repeated resolves by caching index simple responses
🍊 No more progress bar spam in CI
🍊 Deprecation to remove the legacy dependency resolver (--use-deprecated=legacy-resolver)

See @ichard26's post for more!

sichard.ca/blog/2026/07/whats-
#Python #pip

sichard.ca/blog/2026/07/whats-new-in-pip-26.2/
sichard.caWhat's new in pip 26.2 - only-deps and venv isolation! pip 26.2 adds support for installing dependencies exclusively (--only-deps), hashed and non-hashed requirements together (--no-require-hashes), experimental venv-based build isolation, faster repeated dependency resolves, and Python 3.15. Also included are a smattering of bugfixes.

Andrew Nesbitt boosted

Can you help me out with some citations? I'd love reliable articles that support or refute these #AI statements:
0) AI-generated code's harder to review (because it looks plausible but you can't try and work on a "the author meant [thing]" basis)
1) People are less good at reviewing AI-generated code (because they're inclined to trust what the computer says)
2) AI-generated code has high environmental costs (e.g. figures about DC capacity?)
3) Using AI is cognitively harmful

Boosts very welcome

Andrew Nesbitt boosted

The GitHub BlogGitHub Actions holds potentially malicious workflows for approval - GitHub ChangelogRecent supply chain attacks use compromised GitHub credentials to push malicious GitHub Actions workflows that steal CI/CD credentials and carry out additional attacks. To help protect public repositories from these…

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RE: mastodon.me.uk/@Floppy/1169400

This is actually happening; we're building a community to execute a bigotry-free #Rails fork (29 people and increasing at time of writing). Come join us, we need your help and expertise.

matrix.to/#/#amiko:matrix.org

James Smith 💾@Floppy@mastodon.me.uk

I am ashamed of the fact that I’m stuck on #Rails because of the sunk costs of what I’ve already built, as are *so many* other project like Mastodon.

We cannot “just move”, the cost is enormous.

The Rails core team seem utterly compromised and under his spell. Nobody will speak out.

We need a hard #RailsFork. Now. And we need to coordinate to do it together and build a team.

I’m in. Who else?

Andrew Nesbitt boosted

Replying to @⁨andrewnez@mastodon.social⁩

@andrewnez @gvwilson @fedora is planning to use

fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes

which is at the very least SBOM adjacent.

We find that otherwise each packaging ecosyatem has its own way of specifying dependencies, and this makes it harder for security teams to flag issues accurately

fedoraproject.orgChanges/Adopt PURL Metadata - Fedora Project Wiki

Andrew Nesbitt boosted

I know Mastodon hates LLM's and AI. So here goes!

I recently got access to trusted access of cyber capabilities of both openai and anthropic, which also allows you to weaponize security vulnerabilities.

The speed at which these parrots can find bugs and be creative enough to exploit them is staggering.

I recently pointed an LLM at an kernel fix that was reachable by an unprivileged namespace on Debian and it fully weaponized it, without too much me prompting it in the right direction, in about 7-9 hours.

I don't think open-source and companies will know what's coming for them once these open-source weight models will have broader reach and get better at exploiting vulnerabilities on a massive scale as anyone can access them.

The bottom line I think is, you cannot patch faster than the attackers can easily chain all kinds of vulnerabilities together and just move laterally on an incredibly fast pace.

I've started reporting vulnerabilities to all kinds of projects and the majority have trouble or patching issues found. There's not enough maintainers, or there's simply none anymore.

I've been getting quite worried about what our future will look like for data privacy. I think outright not running an LLM over your codebase to find critical security vulnerabilities because of your moral stance will keep us more insecure.

Please run an LLM over your code base if it's internet facing or something critical, we thank you!

Can't wait for the discussions on this!

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Our August meeting is due on Monday 10th August. Once again we are hosted by the kind folks at GoCardless in their offices on Goswell Road.

We have one talk lined up so far:

* @felltir on having shame while metaprogramming

But there's always room for more. Get in touch on talks@lrug.org if you've got something to say.

More about the meeting at lrug.org/meetings/2026/august/ including the all important registration link at tickettailor.com/events/lrug/2

LRUGAugust 2026 Meeting | London Ruby User GroupThe August 2026 meeting of LRUG will be on Monday the 10th of August, from 6:00pm to 8:00pm (meeting starts at 6:30pm). The venue this month is provided by GoCardless and is in their offices, on Goswell Road. Full venue and registration details are given below.

Andrew Nesbitt boosted

Zięba-Kozarzewski 2026: "No Edges, No Verdict: A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Declared Dependency Graphs in 78K SBOMs in the Wild" arxiv.org/abs/2607.22140 "52.9% of SBOMs declare no edges at all, 8.8% declare a dependency block yet leave the majority of components isolated, and 38.3% form well-connected graphs."

arXiv logoarXiv.orgNo Edges, No Verdict: A Large-Scale Empirical Study of Declared Dependency Graphs in 78K SBOMs in the WildSoftware Bills of Materials (SBOMs) are consumed not only as component inventories but as dependency graphs: vulnerability triage, reachability filtering, and impact analysis all traverse the edges an SBOM declares. We present the first large-scale characterization of the declared dependency graph across 78,612 real-world SBOM files from the Wild SBOMs dataset (77,092 parseable). We find that the population splits into three regimes: 52.9% of SBOMs declare no edges at all (failing the NTIA minimum-elements requirement of dependency relationships), 8.8% declare a dependency block yet leave the majority of components isolated (degenerate regime; among such SBOMs with at least 50 components the median orphan share is 93%, and our 11 Syft-generated container-image SBOMs fall in this regime at 95-98% orphans), and 38.3% form well-connected graphs. Edge emission is determined by the generator, not the described software (0%-100% no-edge rates across tools), and the specification-level mechan

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Dietrich et al 2026: "No Snake Oil: Verifying Python Package Builds" arxiv.org/abs/2607.21888 "Although only 15.4% of macaron rebuilds and 19.1% of oss-rebuild rebuilds are byte-for-byte identical to the published PyPI wheels, daleq4py establishes wheel equivalence for 60.2% and 78.9% of source-equivalent rebuilds, respectively."

arXiv logoarXiv.orgNo Snake Oil: Verifying Python Package BuildsPython has become the default language for interacting with AI, with packages being distributed through registries like the Python Package Index (PyPI). This creates a need to analyse supply chains comprising such packages. One such analysis is to rebuild packages in order to identify compromised builds injecting malware. Independent rebuilds in hardened environments have the added advantage that they can generate and record provenance in order to increase the trustworthiness of packages. Two tools that are designed to automate such rebuilds and run them at scale are macaron and oss-rebuild. We study 12,180 popular releases from PyPI and find that the byte-for-byte equivalence rate is generally low. We analyse the reasons why they produce different wheels, and find that equivalence between the original and rebuilt wheels can often still be established, preserving most of the guarantees users expect from rebuildable releases. We present and evaluate daleq4py, a tool to establish the equ

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Replying to @⁨linnane@mastodon.social⁩

Mentioned in the post and worth your time: @zhongruoyu put huge effort into Homebrew's ARM64 Linux support and helping make it a Tier 1 platform. His FOSDEM 2025 talk on that work is excellent.

zhongruoyu.com/talks/homebrew-

Ruoyu ZhongHomebrew on ARM64 LinuxThis talk explored the technical hurdles for adapting the package manager to the ARM64 Linux platform. I examined the work done so far and the ongoing work needed to make Homebrew more accessible and reliable for ARM64 Linux users.

Andrew Nesbitt boosted

Homebrew describes itself as The Package Manager for Everywhere now. I went through our public analytics to see how well that holds up.

@UniversalBlue images are about a quarter of non-CI Linux events, with Bazzite alone at roughly one in five. They ship brew by default and it shows.

If you maintain something that ships Homebrew, I’d like to hear from you.

starhaven.io/blog/2026-07-27-t

The starhaven.io logo: a star above a crescent on a dark field.starhaven.ioThe Package Manager for EverywhereHomebrew has grown far beyond its macOS roots