posted in Technology

German police read WhatsApp messages without cracking encryption

cross-posted from : lemmy.zip/post/71321898

Netzpoltik details that police are able to gain access in this way either through physical access to someone’s phone or by intercepting verification codes via a state-sanctioned phishing attack or intercepting SMS messages via telephone surveillance

cybernews.com/privacy/police-telegram-whatsapp-signal-surveillance-linked-devices/

Replying to @⁨cmnybo@discuss.tchncs.de⁩

Watch out, if those accounts are ever “locked”, you will get permanently locked out of the accounts. Happened to me because a data breach revealed my email address and some idiot tried brute forcing my password. Didn’t work but it broke the account. Secondary recovery email address and correct password wasn’t good enough. Support basically told me to give up and make a new account (???).

Replying to @⁨Natanael@infosec.pub⁩

But with a always on VPN they constantly ask to verify our identity, even with passkey or phone number.

Even when I successfully verify my passkey, they will still sent a SMS code to my recovery number. It’s almost impossible to bypass that step and try another method button redirect again to the same phone verification page. If I didn’t give my number, then this message appears, “there is not enough information to prove this is your account. try again later.”

Maybe VPN is a factor that triggering their security system.

Replying to @⁨SnotFlickerman@lemmy.blahaj.zone⁩

Signal doesn’t offer anything except sms 2fa and requires a phone number. It’s a terrible choice considering LEO can do what they did here and just get legal access to MITM your sms messages, spoof the 2fa, and take over your account, impersonating you. The other ones aren’t encrypted. So none of these they broke into are great choices for truly secure messaging.

Replying to @⁨urushitan@kakera.kintsugi.moe⁩

Signal offers direct key verification (which you need to do out of band) or transparency log key verification (your device can check that senders who you add by number hasn’t had their key change)

The attack here was getting an unlocked device in hand and using the internal sync feature without the user’s knowledge, and the solution to that is always to check your phone after an untrusted person handled it unlocked (or with Cellebrite type devices) - or to simply not offer access to the Signal app while unlocked (perhaps even uninstalling it first).

There is no app which is fully secure against an untrusted third party getting physical access to your unlocked phone, especially not if you have a weak PIN or just fingerprint unlock